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Overlap of Organizations: 
Corporate Transorganization and 
Veblen's Thesis on Higher Education 
F. Gregory Hayden 
and 
Kurt Stephenson 
This article is built upon the legacy fiom three of Thorstein Veblen's 
theories. The first may be best summarized by Martin Gellen who 
wrote: 
Veblen was the first economist to recognize that management was an im- 
portant factor of production in modem business enterprise, and nowhere 
was this more evident than in the rise of the large corporation. . . . These 
new enterprises took over fiom the market the coodnation and integra- 
tion of the flow of goods and services all  the way fiom the production of 
the raw materials through the several processes of production to the sale 
of the ultimate consumer. . . . Veblen perceived correctly that adminis- 
tered production by means of large corporations would eventually spread 
throughout most of the economy [Gellen 1984, pp. 82-83]. 
The second is his observation that the economy should be described 
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as a network of sequential events and decisions [Veblen 18981. Veblen's 
theory on the decisionmaking apparatus of higher education (Veblen 
1957, which will be summarized below, is the third theoretical leg of 
the surveyor's tripod used for the observations in this article. 
The purpose of this research is to accomplish the following: ht, to 
extend the conceptual framework of transorganizational research 
through the Social Fabric Matrix and Digraph [Hayden 1982a and 
1982bl. The literature on transorganizational research is found under 
topics such as interorganizational organization in sociology, director- 
ship interlocks in economics, and organizational structure in manage- 
ment studies. Second, to apply the extended framework to corporate 
translocks in the state of Nebraska. Consistent with the work of Bert 
M. Evans [Evans 19801 and John R. Munkirs [Munkirs 19851, this see 
tion will articulate the integration of Nebraska's centrally coordinated 
planning system that results from the integration of private corpora- 
tions. The articulation will include the determination of what Evans 
called the "dominant core" corporations-what Munkirs designated 
the "central planning core" (CPC). Third, the Nebraska CPC (NCPC) 
data base is used in conjunction with Veblen's thesis on decisionmak- 
ing in higher education, to analyze the relationship between the NCPC 
and the University of Nebraska. 
Overlap Among Organhtions 
As the social sciences have attempted to move beyond self-actional 
and interactional modeling to transactional modeling, an important 
concern has been how to model the overlap or relationships among or- 
ganizations. Although the prefix "inter" is a misnomer in a transac- 
tional world, this literature is sometimes referred to as dealing with 
"interorganizational organizations." Those employing self-action mod- 
els assumed that the behavior of entities or agents is determined by 
inner drives, or motives, or rational utility calculations. With interac- 
tional (inter means between) models, it was assumed that the actions 
and reactions among entities determine reality. Most interaction mod- 
els followed the equilibrium models of Newtonian physics, where en- 
tities are balanced against each other, the antiquated model of the 
interaction and balance between supply and demand is an example. 
Transactional (trans means across) models are based on the more re- 
cent knowledge that proscriptive and prescriptive criteria, customs, 
and control organizations are across and above the entities and guide 
the behavior of those entities in non-isomorphic fields. In a transac- 
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tional, or holistic setting, the social organizations as well as their in- 
tegration linkages (connectives, locks) are created and maintained by 
the actions, rules, and customs that are across the particular entities of 
the system. Reality is not disintegrated; it is scientists who reduce the 
world to disintegrated units with self-actional and interactional models. 
More recently, the scientific job has been discovering how to model 
transactional systems and holistic networks. 
The psychologist, Arthur Bentley, and the economist, John R Com- 
mons, were two early scholars who developed applied transactional 
analysis. John R. Commons defined transactions as the smallest eco- 
nomic unit that can be regularly observed for scientific puposes. Thus, 
when he observed the transaction of buying and selling, it was not to 
give extraordinary meaning to the price artifact, but rather to take ac- 
count of judicial, social, psychological, political, economic, energy, and 
natural components both across and determining the transaction of 
buying and selling [Commons 19681. 
Sociologists Huseyin Leblebici and Gerald Salancik, in their analysis 
of the Chicago Board of Trade, began with Commons's concepts. Their 
study reports how stability of transactions is achieved through transor- 
ganizational working rules. They found that "from the view of a theory 
of organization, this implies that the exchange transactions observed 
in any interorganizational field are not solely under the control and dis- 
cretion of exchange partners themselves, but are the product of collec- 
tive rule making which produces order out of conflict and mutuality" 
[Leblebici and !hlancik 1982, p. 2411. Commons found that for trans- 
actions to proceed, there must be a collective guarantor to the transac- 
tion. "Because of this need for the guarantor, a transaction is not a 
result of the exchange between two parties,. . . but rather the result of 
the collective powers" Dblebici and Salancik 1982, p. 2291. 
The modeling of the transactional relationships among organizations 
can by guided by a number of different methodological approaches. 
The institutionalist approach is one of overlap of the process and de- 
cisionmaking of related organizations. The environment around any 
organization is itself made up of other organizations. Thus, the overlap 
itself is an institutional entity and of scientific interest to thle institu- 
tional researcher [See: Bush 1983 and 1987. The organizations are not 
separate; they are provided with functions, criteria, and decisionmak- 
ers that integrate the overlapping organizations. The srnrcture and pro- 
cess of each organization is part of other organizations. In this article, 
the institutional and transactional approach wil l  be used. 
Consistent with such utilization, terms to designate linkages, locks, 
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deliveries, and connectives will, when prefixed, be prefixed with "transw 
rather than "interw in order to be consistent with transactional analysis. 
The etymology and specification of the prefix "inter" is inconsistent 
with the manner and means through which relations among organiza- 
tions are established and maintained. The distinction is important with 
regard to policy concerns. If relationships among organizations were 
really limited and determined by those organizations, they would be 
immune to public policy. If it is, however, understood and designated 
that the functioning of relationships depends on the transactional be- 
liefs, criteria, customs, policies, laws, and rules that exist across and 
outside the particular organizational transaction, then it is possible to 
redesign those transactions through public policy. As John Dewey and 
Arthur Bentley stated, "naming does things. It states. To state, it must 
both conjoin and disjoin, identify as distinct and identify as co~ected" 
[Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 1331. If the naming is inconsistent with 
the identification of what is known, the misdesigdon will encourage 
the development of policy inconsistent with scientific findings. 
Relevant Corporate Transorganizational Literature 
The "interorganizational organizationw literature in sociology dates 
back to at least the 1800s, and includes studies on fhmilies, corpora- 
tions, markets, government agencies, military confederations, classes 
and so forth. An important part of that literature deals with the overlap 
of corporations, especially the exchange of directors among corporate 
boards. What has been missing in such studies, according to Charles J. 
Fombrun, has been an integrated transactional, or holistic, approac3 
for understanding and modeling the MI sociostructure "as h s  strug- 
gle to manage their common fate" pombrun 1986, p. 41 11. 
In his book, The Transformation of American Capitalism, John 
Munkirs argues, consistent with Evans, that most of the production and 
distribution decisions in the American economy are not made by the 
invisible hand of the market, but by a small number of closely linked 
corporations wunkirs 19851. Munkirs traces the evolution of the 
American economy from the birth of industrial trusts after the Civil 
War to the present day economy, dominated by "centralized private 
sector planning" (CPSP). At the center of the CPSP process is a small 
number of large banks and insurance corporations, which Munkirs la- 
bels the "central planning core" (CPC). The CPC possesses an im- 
pressive array of both formal and informal planning instruments with 
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which to coordinate and direct economic activity. Formal planning in- 
struments available to the CPC include shared stock and debt owner- 
ship and overlapping boards of directors. Informal planning 
instruments, which serve as a network of informational conduits 
among CPC corporations, include legal and financial services such as 
shared trustees, registrars, and transfer agents. The CPC delivers infor- 
mation and direction through these collective planning instruments to 
corporations in vital industrial, transportation, and retail sectors of the 
economy. What emerges fiom this private centrally planned process is 
a technologically, financially, and administratively overlapping group 
of large corporations. 
Munkirs developed and organized a substantial data base for his 
book. His empirical work leads us to a new theory of the h. The 
locus of a corporation's decisionmaking in the modem economy is not 
based on marginal cost and revenue considerations of an independent 
competitive h as explained by Atfied Marshall., it is not based on 
the mutual dependence recognized considerations of an oligopoly firm 
as explained by Edward Chamberlin; and it is not the result of the team 
of technocrats in the large corporation as emphasized by John Gal- 
braith. According to Munkirs, the locus of decisionmaking is the reo- 
ognized planning arrangements undertalcen and enforced jointly by 
overlapping governing boards and other planning instruments of global 
corporations. 
Munkirs demonstrates empirically how in one industry after another 
governing boards are connected to the CPC and to other governing 
boards through different kinds of overlaps. Through his elaboration of 
a central planning tableau, he shows how the CPC has placed itself in 
a position to plan for more than 100 of the largest U.S. corporations. 
The tableau demonstrates: 
how firms in a given industry. . . are technologically, financially, 
and administratively interdependent; 
how each of several industries. . . are technologically, financially, 
and administratively interdependent; and 
how over the years, a series of planning instruments have evolved 
that both allow and indeed, to some extent, necessitate regional, na- 
tional, and international centralized private sector planning [Munkirs 
1985, p. 51. 
Munkirs's work leaves us with a general theory regarding the impor- 
,tance of centralized patterns in organizational overlap, and with meth- 
ods to meet Fombrun's call for modeling the complex constructs of full 
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sociostmctures. Our goal is to refine the concept of organizational over- 
lap, and to explain methods which can be used to identi6 and derive 
centralized patterns of overlap. 
Overlap and Reachability Concepts 
Conceptually, the concern is with the overlapping sets that define the 
network and delivery process. This can be explained with the use of the 
simple digraph (directed graph) in F ' i  1. Assume that E,F,G,H, and 
I are five organizations-five different corporations in this case. Cor- 
porations can make various kinds of deliveries to each other. In this 
case we will be concerned with the delivery of directors. The deliveries 
among the organizations, for example djrectors D, through D,in Figure 
1, are an important part of their transorganizational relationships. The 
importance, or central position, of any corporation would depend on 
the number of Werent kinds of transorganizational sets in which the 
corporation is involved, and on the number of deliveries within each 
set. If two corporations each send one director to the other's board, the 
degree of overlap would be less than if the same corporations shared 
four directors. 
Figure 1 .  Organization Overlap and Reachability Digraph 
We are specifying three different kinds of organizational overlap sets. 
They are primary, secondary, and tertiary sets, which are demonstrated 
in Figure 1 with the use of dotted lines to outline the different sets. 
Primary Overlap: A primary corporate translock 0 is outlined in 
Figure 1 with the rectangle around E and F. (Appendix A contains a 
glossary of acronyms and symbols for the reader's convenience.) As in- 
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dicated, director D, serves on the boards of corporations E and F. Cor- 
poration E is involved in one PCT with F and has one primary director 
translock (PDT). The PDT indicates the delivery level (number deliv- 
ered). Although not outlined by a dotted line in Figure 1, other FXX 
sets include those between G and F, F and H, and H and I. Corporation 
G, for example, has one PCT and three PDTs with corporation F. With 
a primary overlap, the directors on the two governing boards meet to- 
gether at each other's board meetings to plan together for the two cor- 
porations involved. 
Secondary Overlap: A secondary corporate translock (SCT) is out- 
lined in Figure 1 by a set (enclosed by a triangle) which includes cor- 
porations F,H, and I. Corporation I has a SCT with corporation F 
through corporation H. This example of a SCT has three secondary di- 
rector translocks (SDTs), which are D, D,, and D, Other SCT sets in 
Figure 1 include E with G and G with H. With a secondary overlap, 
the directors ox! the two governing boards are still meeting together 
face-to-fkce in planning sessions on a third governing board, which has 
an overlapping interest in the two SCT corporations. There are direct 
planning relationships between the two companies, and the directors 
involved have direct face-to-h reachability with regird to decisions 
in a deliberative setting. 
Tertiary Overlap: A tertiary corporate translock (To is outlined in 
Figure 1 by a dotted line set that includes corporations E,F,H, and I. 
Corporation E has a TCT with corporation I through corporation F and 
H. This example of a TCT has four tertiary director translocks (TDTs). 
They are Dj, D, D, and D7. Unlike primary and secondary corporate 
overlaps, there are not necessarily direct &ce-to-face relationships at a 
governing board meeting between the directors fiom E and I. To use 
the example in Figure 1, after D, and D, meet at corporation F, delib 
erative decisions and plans, if they are to include corporation I, must 
take place at the board meeting of corporation H. E has reachability to 
I, but it can be once removed fiom direct f ce-to-f8ce planning delib- 
erations, as indicated in Figure 1. Another TCT in Figure 1 is G with 
I though F and H, with six TDTs. The TDTs are Dj, D, D, and D, 
Figure 1 is, of course, too limited to portray all the various sets of 
corporations in a real world context. We can observe fiom F i i  1, 
however, that corporation F is a central organbation in the process net- 
work. It is involved in more organizational overlap sets, and has more 
reachability to other corporations, and a greater level of deliveries, in 
terms of directors, than any other corporation. It lies in the intersection 
of all three sets. 
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Extension with the Social Matrix and Digraph 
The Social Fabric Matrix (SFM) can be used to extend the organha- 
tion overlap concepts and to apply the concepts to the complex and 
redundant overlaps of the real world. To explain this application of the 
SFM, corporations A, B, C, J, and K are arrayed along both sides of 
the matrix in Figure 2, and the delivery of directors from one corpora- 
tion to another corporation is indicated in the cells. For example, cor- 
poration A delivers its board member X to the board of corporation B, 
and member Z to corporation J. As another example, C delivers Y to 
B, Z to J, and two members, N and M are sent to K The rows and 
columns can be aggregated as in Figure 2, and thus the various overlaps 
defined above are specified in the matrix as follows: 
Flgure 2. Sociaf Fabric MoMx of Corporale Direct Deliveries. 
PCP The total PCT's a corporation has with other corporations is 
the total number of cells with entries in the corporation's row in the 
SFM. For example, the row total for cell entries for corporation C is 3. 
PDT: The total PDTs involved in a corporations PCTs is the total 
number of directors in a corporations row. For example, the row total 
for directors for corporation C is 4. 
SCP The total SCTs a corporation has with other corporations is 
the total number of cells with entries, less 1, in the column, for columns 
with a corporation's director delivery to a FCT. For example, the total 
SCTs for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the cell en- 
tries of columns 2 and 4, less 1 for each column. Or, corporation A is 
involved in 5 SCTs [(3-1)+(4-1)=5]. To find the SCTs for A, read 
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across the row from left to right (as indicated with the directed dashed 
line). In column 2, director X from A is serving on the board of B (a 
PCT). If we read down, it will be discovered that corporations C and J 
also deliver Y and N respectively to the board of B. Thus, A has a SCT 
with C and another with J through B. Because B is the direct PCT 
through which the SCTs with C and J are accomplished, it is not 
counted in the total. A similar SCT case exists in column 4. 
SDR The total SDTs participating in a corporation's STCs is the to- 
tal number of directors in the column that contains a corporation's de- 
livery of directors to a PCT. For example, the total SDT for corporation 
A can be found by the aggregation of the cell entries of columns 2 and 
4, for a total of 7. To find the SDT total for A, read across the row fiom 
left to right. In column 2, director X serves on the board of B. All of 
the directors in column 2 are members of the SDT. A similar SDT case 
exists in column 4, in which there are four SDTs. 
TCT: The total TCTs to which a corporation belongs is the total 
number of cells with entries, less 1, for rows in which there is a corpora- 
tion with which the original corporation has an SCT. For example, the 
total TCTs for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the 
cell entries, less 1, for each row, for rows 3 and 4. Or, stated differently, 
corporation A participated in 5 T m s  [(3-1)+(4-1)=5] through corpo- 
ration B. To find a TCT for A, read across row 1 (still following the 
directed dashed line) fiom left to right to a PTC (column 2), go down 
that column to a S m ,  and then aggregate all the cell entries in that row 
(row 3) minus 1. The 1 is subtracted in that row for the SCT through 
which the TCT is formed. A similar TCT case exists for row 4. This 
calculation would need to be repeated (not indicated by dashed lines 
in Figure 2) for each SCT through corporation J in column 4 to obtain 
the total number of TCTs for corporation A, or 5 TCTs [(3-l)+(3- 1)+ 
(2-1)=5]. Thus, the total TCTs for corporation A is 10, [5+5]. 
TDF The total TDTs are the total number of directors in the TCT 
rows plus the number of directors in the PCT cell from which each TCT 
originates. For example, the total for corporation A is 23. To find the 
TCT total for A, read across the row fiom left to right. There is 1 direc- 
tor in PCX cell (1,2). Reading down from cell (1,2), row 3 has 4 directors 
plus the 1 director in cell (1,2). A similar process is followed for row 4. 
Reading down fiom cell (1,4), row 2 has 3 directors plus the 1 director 
in cell (1'4) fiom which the TCT in row 2 originates. A similar process 
is followed for rows 3 and 5. Thus [(4+ 1) + (4+ 1) + (3+1) + (4+1) + 
(3+1)] - 23. 
The matrix in Figure 2 is laid out in digraph format in Figure 3, 
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which clarifies reachability and redundancy. By observing Figure 3, it 
is more obvious that corporation A reached J through numerous chan- 
nels-with a direct PCT, with a SCT through B, and with a TCT 
through B and C. These redundant linkages enhance the opportunity 
for the decisions and plans to be made conjointly and implemented 
effectively. Numerous corporations govern in a manner that relies on 
corporation J effectively maintaining the plan coordinated with cor- 
poration A, and the directors from those corporations who sit on the 
governing board of J emphasize that reliance. These are redundant re- 
inforcement channels. Equally important, all those corporations reach 
A. Stated differently, A reaches itself indirectly through these linkages. 
At first blush this statement may sound irrelevant. Yet, upon reflection, 
it means that the directors delivered to A's board fiom other wrpora- 
tions can remind A of A's original decisions and their reliance on the 
original decisions, and thereby reinforce the plan that leads to continu- 
ity of the economic process. This planning transmission cycle is consis- 
tent with the institutional theory of cumulative circular causation. 
Figure 3. Social Fabric Digraph of Corporate Director Deliveries 
Nebraska Corgoatio~ ' 
To articulate the network process of organization overlap among pri- 
vate corporations in Nebraska, we began by collecting for each corpora- 
tion the names of directors and officers, the value of assets and sales, 
and the names of the law firms and accounting firms used by each cor- 
poration.' After an arduous and lengthy search, such data were col- 
lected on 348 Nebraska corporations. 
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Pattern of Nebraska Corporate Overlap 
Early in the data collection process, it became apparent fiom casual 
observation that there is considerable overlap among the governing 
boards of Nebraska corporations. Computer assistance made it possi- 
ble to select only corporations having at least one PCT. Next, to dis- 
cover the pattern of the overlapping governing boards, the corporations 
with at least one PCX were entered into a Social Fabric Matrix (as ex- 
plained above). The list included 100 corporations, thus requiring a 
matrix of 100 rows and 100 columns. The number of directors fiom 
each corporation that serves on another board were entered into the 
relevant matrix cells, and the PCTs, PDTs, SCTs, SDTs, TCTs, and 
TDTs were aggregated in the type of matrix explained above and illus- 
trated in Figure 2.2 The results of the aggregation, for those corpora- 
tions with four or more PCTs, are rank ordered in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 1, along with the number of PDTs in column 3. There were 30 
corporations with four or more PCTs. FirsTier Financial, the top 
ranked in direct board connections, had 30 PCTs and 42 PDTs. This 
means FirsTier had at least one of its directors serving on 30 other Ne- 
braska corporation boards; and on the boards of other corporations, 
FirsTier held 42 board positions. 
In determining director deliveries among boards, board members of 
subsidiary corporations were included as members of the parent cor- 
poration's board. This was one in order to not multiply the apparent 
number of translocks of particular boards and members. Board mem- 
bers fiom the parent company are often on the subsidiary board. We 
did not consider that arrangement as constituting a separate corporate 
overlap because these members all belong to the same corporation. 
Had such internal deliveries of board members been counted, the totals 
in Table 1 would have multiplied considerably. 
The ranking by the number of SCTs is given in columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 1. The corporations with 30 or more SCTs are listed. Column 6 
contains their corresponding number of SDTs. Of interest are the cor- 
porations that did not make the PCT and PDT list, which are included 
in the SCT and SDT list. They are Farmers Mutual Insurance, Wood- 
men Accident and Life, Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., IBP, Mall 
Corp., and the Nebraska Farmer (all indicated with an asterisk in Table 
1, column 4). These are all corporations which were connected with a 
PCX to FirsTier. Any corporation with a FCT to FirsTier would auto- 
matically be involved with at least 29 SCTs. This allows us to see that 
a corporation can be well ~ 0 ~ e ~ t e d  and prominent in the system with- 
out a large number of PCTs if its PCTs are with other central corpora- 
tions. As an example, Mutual of Omaha has only three PCTs, but one 
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is with FirsTier. The reverse of that situation can be seen with First 
National of Nebraska, parent of First National-Omaha. First National 
of Nebraska appears in column 1, but not in columns 4 and 7. It does 
not have a PCT with FirsTier Financial or with other central corpora- 
tions; thus, it does not generate enough SCTs to qualie for the list in 
column 4. 
The ranking by the number of TCI's appears in columns 7 and 8 of 
Table 1. Those corporations with 170 or more TCI's are listed. Column 
9 contains their corresponding number of TDTs. As with the SCT rank- 
ing, there are corporations in the top 26 with respect to the number of 
TCTs that are not listed in columns 1 and 4 (as indicated by an as- 
terisk). Of greater interest, the SFM allows us to discover the large num- 
ber of other corporations that any corporation can reach on a tertiary 
basis. For example, FirsTier with 30 PCTs, is involved in 447 tertiary 
board overlaps and has 886 TDTs. 
At this point in our analysis, it is apparent that Nebraska has a cen- 
tralized private sector planning (CPSP) system similar to that found by 
Munkirs for the national economy wunkirs 19851. Some differences 
are also apparent. For those familiar with Munkirs's findings, one a p  
parent difference is that the Nebraska system is more centralized than 
the national system in the distribution of direct board of directors 
translocks and in the board members involved in the translocks. Ne- 
braska's PCTs and PDTs are both less equally distributed than at the 
national level. However, the centricity of the system and reachability 
within the system, rather than differences with the national system, are 
the interests in this article. 
Nebraska Central Planning Core 
The criterion used to determine the corporations that make up the 
Nebraska Central Planning Core (NCPC) is the degree of reachability 
of a corporation to the dominant corporations at the center of the core 
decision network. From Table 1, it is clear that FirsTier Financial, Lin- 
coln Telecommunications, First Commerce Bmcshares, and Ameritas 
Life Insurance are the top four corporations with the most connections 
in PCT, SCT, and TCT categories. In addition, all four have a PCT 
with the other three. Because these four corporations are the most 
central, the other corporations in Table 1 are ranked with respect to 
their reachability to these central corporations. Some corporations list- 
ed in Table 1 were deleted from consideration as a NCPC corporation 
because of their relatively small size.3 In addition, some corpora- 
tions, such as IBP and Pegler-Sysco, were deleted from consideration 
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because it was the authors' assessment that the major decisions for 
those corporations were made outside Nebraska. IBP is a subsidiary of 
Occidental Petroleum and the national corporate headquarters of 
Pegler-Sysco is in Houston, Texas. 
The final list of corporations comprising the NCPC are in Table 2 
along with the total number of various types of translock sets by which 
each corporation reached the four leaders. For example, in the case of 
Valmont, FirsTier is reached through a PCT, 5 SCTs and 17 TCTs. 
After determining the connections to the four central corporations, the 
lock sets are weighted by assigning each PCT a weight of 5, each SCT 
the weight of 3, and each TCT the weight of 1.4 The total, determined 
by multiplying the number of PCTs, SCTs, and TCTs by their respec- 
tive weights, is found in the final column of Table 2. Using this manner 
of determination, it was found, for example, that Crete Camer (with a 
total of 1 12) has over two and one-half times the reachability to the 
central corporations as Guarantee Mutual Life (with a total of 42). The 
NCPC consists of four banks (FirsTier, First Commerce Bancshares, 
Norwest Nebraska, and Union Bank and Trust); five insurance com- 
panies (Guarantee Mutual Life, Woodmen Accident and Life, Farmers 
Mutual, Security Mutual Life, and Ameritas Life); one investment 
holding corporation (Berkshire Hathaway), and five production corpo- 
rations (Crete Camer, ConAgra, Peter Kiewit, Lincoln Telecommuni- 
cations, and Valmont Industries). 
Directorship deliveries among the NCPC corporations are indicated 
in the NCPC Social Fabric Matrix contained in Figure 4, and in the 
NCPC Social Fabric Digraph contained in Figure 5. The deliveries are 
found by reading the SFM across ftom left to right. For example, as 
indicated in row 1, FirsTier delivers 4 directors (4 PDT's) to Wood- 
men, 3 to ConAgra, 3 to Valmont, and so forth. The total PCTs for 
each corporation within the core is found in column 16 and their total 
PDTs within the core are found in column 17. By adding each column, 
less one, where FirsTier has a PCT, the total SDTs in the core can be 
determined for FirsTier. For example, in Column 14, the director deliv- 
ered from FirsTier to Lincoln Telecommunications (cell 1,14) meets 
with directors who also serve as directors of First Commerce Bane 
shares, Ameritas Life, Woodmen, and so forth, because directors fiom 
those corporations also serve on Lincoln Telecommunication's board. 
To find the TDTs, as explained earlier in Figure 2, one would read left 
and right from each SDT. For example, FirsTier's SDT in cell (3,14) 
also allows FirsTier to reach Norwest Nebraska in cell (3,2) to provide 
information and influence on a tertiary basis. 
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The translock network among these central core corporations is eas- 
ier to conceptualize by observing Figure 5. In Figure 5 the nodes are 
the component corporations and the edges (lines) are the deliveries of 
directors. Since the director delivery is in both directions, only one line 
with an arrow on each end is used. For example, if two corporations, 
such as FirsTier and First Commerce Bancshares, both have a director 
serve on the other's board, that is indicated with one edge. Numbers 
are used in Figure 5 to represent the director's names. That number 
and the name to which it corresponds are found in Appendix B. The 
names of directors are included in order that readers may correct us if 
the public documents from which the data base is compiled are inac- 
curate, and in order to allow others to complete a surname analysis. 
These corporations exchange governing board members, plan to- 
gether on each others' boards, and exchange information through direct 
and indirect linkages and planning functions. Within the NCPC, 13 of 
the 15 members deliver a president or CEO to other core corporations. 
In addition, although the data base is not contained in this article, some 
keep deposits with each other, serve as each others' agents, and own 
each others' stock. Because these corporations are highly integrated, the 
welfare of one affects the welfare of others. Thus, it is a system of mu- 
tual advantage recognized arrangements, to use Bert Evans's term, 
through which they (legally and systematically) plan together. They do 
not belong to a competitive system of decentralized, independent Eree 
enterprise. They belong to a centralized private sector planning system, 
to use John Munkirs's term, of which they are the central core mem- 
bers. We see that the NCPC is closely integrated in its decisionmaking 
functions and is an information diffusion system. Through this net- 
work, and through their numerous overlaps with other Nebraska cor- 
porations (see Table I), these corporations can diffuse their plans across 
the corporate board structure of the Nebraska economy. 
Tke ~ebrasku CPC and the Unimity of Nebrasku 
Next we will use Thorstein Veblen's ideas relevant to university ad- 
ministration as a guide to relate the Nebraska CPC to the administra- 
tion of the University of Nebraska. Veblen's relevant work on the 
subject is his book, The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum 
on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men [Veblen 19571. The sub- 
title is the important aspect for our purposes here. (Especially relevant 
to the Nebraska case is the use of the word "Men.")5 
Veblen found the maxims that guided the major universities of his 
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day did not lead them to be in the senrice of science and scholarship, 
but rather, the maxims that guided their conduct were those found in 
the marketplace and the world of pecuniary gain. The reason their con- 
duct was so directed was because the universities were dominated by 
governing boards made up of businessmen and university presidents 
with powem positions. Therefore, the "aims and methods of the 
scholars and schools devoted to the higher learning" [Veblen 1957, p. 
31 are found to be influenced by the "habitual pursuit of business in 
modern times" [Veblen 1957, p. 31. 
The university administrative apparatus reflected the seadarkation 
of the United States by the substitution of laymen for clergymen on the 
governing boards. Veblen wrote, "the substitution is a substitution of 
businessmen and politicians; which amounts to saying that it is a sub- 
stitution of businessmen. So that the discretionary control in matters 
of university policy now rests finally in the hands of businessmen" 
[Veblen 1957, p. 461. He found that "poor men and men without large 
experience in business a f b h  are felt to have no place in these bodies" 
[Veblen 1957, p. 471. The effective control of the university, according 
to Veblen, "is exercised through the board's control of the budget" 
[Veblen 1957, p. 581, because "the academic staffcan do little else than 
what the specifications of the budget provide for. . . " [Veblen 1957, p. 
581. The power of the purse gives the governing boards the power to 
establish the beliefs and criteria to guide the university, and "the fact 
is that businessmen hold the plenary direction, and that business prin- 
ciples guide them in their management of the a&rirs of the higher learn- 
ing. . . " [Veblen 1957, p. 571. The academic administrator is "vested 
with somewhat autocratic powers" [Veblen 1957, p. 591 by the board 
and "he is in effect responsible to the governing board alone" [Veblen 
1957, p. 591 and therefore the mind set of the board; a mind set which 
does not habitually look beyond the "interest of commercial gain and 
the commonplaces of commercial routine and political bravado" [Veb- 
len 1957, p. 1741. 
Veblen found that business boards, as a rule, "will be carell to give 
their general manager full discretion, and not to hamper him with too 
close an accounting of the details of his administration, so long as he 
shows gratifjing results. He must be a strong man; that is to say, a ca- 
pable man of afkirs, tenacious and resourcell in turning the mews at 
hand to account for this purpose, and easily content to let the end jus- 
tify the means" [Veblen 1957, p. 661. The fierce campaign of aspirants 
for executive office in universities tests their qwdiilcations against the 
standards expected by the board, and tests their strength under pres- 
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sure. "These boards are made up of well-to-do businessmen, with a pen- 
chant for popular notability; and the qualifications necessary to put in 
evidence by aspirants for executive o5ce are such as will convince such 
a board of their serviceability" [Veblen 1957, p. 1801. There are many 
more candidates willing to serve such boards than positions available; 
thus, the aspirant9s trial under fire provides a process to prove his ag- 
gressiveness and strength. 
In point of fact, here as in political office-seeking, the most 
active factor that goes to decide the selection of the eventual incumbents 
of oftice is a tenacious aggressive self-selection. With due, but by no means 
large, allowance for exceptions, the incumbents are chosen fiom among a 
self-selected body of candidates, each of whom has, in the common run 
of cases, been resolutely in pursuit of such an oftioe for some appreciable 
time, and has spent much time and endeavor on fitting himself for its du- 
ties. Commonly it is only after the aspirant has achieved a settled reputa- 
tion of eligibility and a predilection for the office that he will finally secure 
appointment [Veblen 1957, p. 1791. 
This was the university decision model that Veblen observed at the 
turn of the century for the major U.S. universities. Universities have, 
of come, changed considerably since that time in some ways consistent 
with, and, in other ways, in response to Veblen9s suggestions and crit- 
icism. Veblen, however, was not modeling state universities. They were 
, not the major universities early in this century. 
The NCPCflU Social Fabric Matrix 
As we saw above, the decisionmaking institutions of the corporate 
-.business community have evolved to a new process since the time of 
Veblen. We should also expect that the relationship between modem 
state universities and the new business complex has also changed. Be- 
cause the CPC is the dominant core of business decisions in the 
centrally private sector planning system, we might expect that a univer- 
sity's connection with the business community would be through the 
CPC. We will begin testing such a hypothesis by determining the rela- 
tionships between the NCPC and the University of Nebraska (NU). 
To outline the extent of such overlap, NU is added to the SFM of 
the NCPC found in Figure 4 above. The new SFM with NU included 
is found in Figure 6, and the digraph expressing the matrix of Figure 
6, as a directed graph, is found in Figure 7. Included in the NU system 
for 1988-1989 are the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UN-L), the 
University of Nebraska-Omaha ),the University of Nebraska 
Medical Center, and the University of Nebraska Foundation. 
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The delivery entries in Figure 6 are the same as in Figure 4 except 
for the NU system, add@ as row 16 and column 16. The entries in row 
16 are the deliveries made by NU to the NCPC corporations, and in 
column 16 the entries are the deliveries made fiom the NCPC corpo- 
rations to NU. The deliveries fiom NU to the corporations are desig- 
nated by U, which indicates that those persons are in an important 
decisionmaking position at the university. They a l l  serve in two 
capacities-as a university official and as a corporate director. This be- 
comes clear as we explain the row cells in Column 16 in which there 
are entries. They are as follows: 
Matrix Cell Explanation ofDeliiwry 
Row Cell (1.16) FirsTier delivers 11 directors to NU positions. Those positions an: 
Chancellor of UN-L, Via  President of NU, Foundation Award Com- 
mittee. Foundation Executive Committee, Foundation Administra- 
tive Committee, Foundation Development Committee, and eight of 
FhTier's board directors smre on the Foundation Board of Directors 
Row Cell (2,16) Norwest Nebraska delivers three directors to NU positions. Those po- 
sitions are: Via Chanallm of Un-L, Chancellor of Un-0, Via M- 
&nt of NU, and two Foundation BODS. 
Row Cell (3,16) Fmt Commerce Ban- &livers four directors to NU positions. 
Those positions an: Athletic Director, Dean of the College of Busi- 
ness, UN-L, Foundation Nominating Committee, and a NU Regent. 
Row Cell (5,16) Ameritas Life delivers three directors to NU positions. Those posi- 
tions an: Foundation Mministrative Committee. Foundation Award 
Committee, Foundation Executive Committee, and three Foundation 
BODS. 
Row Cell (6,16) Guarantee Mutual delivers two directors to NU positions. Those posi- 
tions are: President of NU, Foundation Budget and F i a  Commit- 
tee, Foundation Executive Committee, and Foundation BOD. 
Row Cell (7,16) Woodman Accident & Lifk &livers two directors to NU positions. 
Those positions are: Foundation Award Committee, Chanallor 
UN-L, Via  Pmident of NU, and two Foundation BODS. 
Row Cell (8,16) M t y  Mutual delivers a director to a NU position. That position is 
Head Football Coach, UN-L 
Row Cell (9,16) Fanners Mutual delivers two directors to NU positions. Those posi- 
tions are: Foundation Budget and Fmce Committee, Foundation 
Executive Committee, and Foundation BOD. 
Row Cell (1 3,16) Valmont delivers three directors to NU positions. Those positions art: 
Dean of the College of Business, UN-L Foundation Consultant, and 
Foundation Administxative Committee. 
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Row Cell (14,16) Lincoln Telecommunications delivers five directors to NU positions. 
Those positions are: Foundation Administrative Committee, Founda- 
tion Executive Committee, Foundation Consultant, Foundation De- 
velopment Committee, and two Foundation BODS. 
Row Cell (1 5,16) Crete Camer delivers a director to NU positions. Those positions are: 
Foundation Administrative Committee, Foundation Executive Cum- 
mittee, and Foundation BOD. 
These entries are displayed in Figure 7. The digraph in Figure 7 in- 
dicates the number of UDs (a UD being a person who is both a NU 
official and a NCPC corporate director). Following the indication of the 
number of UDs are the numbers that correspond to the person's name 
in Appendix B. By adding NU to the NCPC matrix and digraph, the 
substantial degree to which the University is corn& to the 15 core 
corporations, and the extent of their director deliveries, become clear. 
NU has more primary translocks than any other corporation in the ma- 
trix: there are 37 corporate officials involved in 1 1 primary translocks. 
In comparison, FirsTier, as the highest ranking corporation in primary 
translocks, has fewer the NU. FirsTier has 32 officials involved in 11 
primary translocks. The highest number of primary locks between any 
two institutions occurs between FirsTier and NU. There are 1 1. Exclud- 
ing the University, the greatest number of PCTs between two corpora- 
tions is 4. Of the 15 corporations that comprise the NCPC, 73 percent 
deliver at least 1 director to NU. The NCPC also provides almost 50 
percent of the directors to the University of Nebraska Foundation 
Board of Directors, and holds 50 percent of the foundation committee 
chairships. 
The overlap articulated here between the NCPC and NU should not 
be considered exhaustive. First, if documents that are not public could 
be accessed, there may be additional direct exchanges. Second, if ad- 
ditional corporations, beyond those in the core, were included in the 
matrix, additional connections between NU and the NCPC, through 
~econdary and tertiary connections, would be articulated Third, if 
different kinds of organizations, for example law firms, in addition to 
business corporations were included in the matrix, additional reach- 
ability between the CPC and NU would be defined. An example is the 
law firm of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson and Oldfather (Cline, 
Williams). Its clients include NU and FirsTier Bank. In 1988-1989, 
when Cline, Williams represented FirsTier and NU, Warren Johnson 
fiom their law firm was on the board of directors of FirsTier and also 
served on the University of Nebraska Foundation board of directors. 
Fourth, if different kinds of deliveries were included, additional over- 
Overlap of Organizations 75 
laps would be spec8ed. Numerous examples come to mind in this cate- 
gory. For example, Kiewit Construction was the contractor for the 
recently completed Durham lab science center at the University of 
Nebraska-Omaha campus, and Kiewit is currently building the health 
care facility at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. As another 
example, ConAgra has delivered money and expertise to the University 
of Nebraska-Lincoln for the establishment and purposes of the Agri- 
business Program. The brochure for the Agribusiness Program states, 
In 1981, ConAgra approached UN-L with the idea of an agribusiness pro- 
gram which would provide students with a sound background of both 
business and agriculture knowledge and skills. ConAgra and UN-L set 
goals for the program. C o w  and the University Foundation commit- 
ted five years of funding to give the program a sound start [Agribusiness 
fiograml. 
This statement clarifies that it was not UN-L faculty or administra- 
tors who initiated the idea. Beyond initiating the idea, ConAgra helped 
set goals for the state university program. In addition, ConAgra, along 
with the NCPC directors who dominate the University Foundation, 
committed funding for the ~r0gra.m.~ 
Conchding Obsentmio~s 
This article extends the conceptual and applied analysis on the over- 
lap of organizations by using the Social Fabric Matrix. From this en- 
deavor, our concluding observations are as follows. 
First, the application of the SF'M extends the conceptuaI and applied 
knowledge base on overlaps in a number of ways. It provides a method 
for explicitly specifying the primary, secondary, and tertiary overlaps. 
Thus, it allows for a more complete organization of data for analysis. 
By using the SFM to ferret out these overlap sets, the large number of 
secondary and tertiary translocks, not previously discovered, are spec- 
ified 
The SFM and its concomitant digraph allows for the description of 
the decision network that Veblen thought was necessary for m w  
theoretical work to be completed. The SF'M digraph allows us to give 
more precision to the concept of process; in this case, the decision pro- 
cess among corporations. By specifjing the decision network, the ques- 
tion with regard to the set of beliefs, myths, ideologies, and their legal 
expressions that guide the process pattern presents itself perforce. For 
policy purposes, the SFM must be expanded in the future to include 
these entities. 
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All systems experience hierarchical arrangements that have to be ar- 
ticulated for the system to be understood. The SFM approach allows 
us to find the decision hierarchy by identifj.ing both the central corpo- 
rations and the reachability paths for information to be diffused from 
those corporations. Too many corporate overlap studies have ignored 
hierarchy and the central core corporations. By treating all corporations 
the same (of equal importance), the findings in the studies lose validity. 
For example, a number of studies have been completed on whether 
broken ties between corporations are reconstituted with the same firm. 
Most have ignored the hierarchy within the network by comparing total 
ties to reconstituted ties. However, Linda Steams and Mark Mizuchi 
found that reconstitution is a function of the corporation's power in 
the network [Steams and Mizuchi 1986, p. 5361. Thus, distinctions 
must be made with regard to a corporation's position in the hierarchy 
before other distinctions can be tested. "All social systems-hence, all 
organizations--exist in an institutional environment that defines and 
delimits social reality. . . . To neglect their presence and power is to ig- 
nore significant causal factors shaping organizational structures and 
practices: to overlook these variables is to misspeGifL our causal mod- 
els" [Scott 1987, pp. 507-81. 
The SFM approach does not prejudge where the center lies. In Ne- 
braska, the CPC included corporations involved in banking, insurance, 
communications, food processing, equipment production, investment, 
transportation, and so forth. The SFM method determines the central 
core and the degree of reachability to the core, rather than forcing inves- 
tigators to hypothesize the core. 
Yngve Ramstad has stated that institutionalist knowlwe gains plau- 
sibility and validation as it is validated in different contexts [Ramstad 
1986, pp. 1072-731. The findings in this article are a "real type." The 
real type is the Nebraska context and the findings are consistent with 
Munkirs's real type findings in the national context. This strengthens 
the theory [Ramstad 1986, p. 10721. The next step, according to Ram- 
stad, is to capture linkages and connections between the two contexts 
in order to constitute the system's unity and wholeness. "These specific 
linkages are what contribute to the system's uniqueness" [Ramstad 
1986, p. 10721. This article uncovers how to begin sped& that link- 
age. The linkage between the national CPC and NCPC, it appears, is 
accomplished by national and global corporations, such as IBP and 
ConAgra, which are linked to both the national and local systems. 
With regard to the relationship between a modem state university 
and a state CPC, it is evident that the integration and overlap between 
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the two is much more pervasive and complex than the simple relation- 
ship Veblen described as existing between governing boards and ad- 
ministrators early in this century. To correspond with Veblen's findings 
for the private university, we might have expected the NCPC to have 
overlapped extensively with the Board of Regents at NU. However, the 
NCPC is not integrated into NU'S decisionmaking through NU'S 
elected Board of Regents. Only one Regent held a position with a 
NCPC corporation. He held a position with a subsidary of a NCPC 
corporation. The integration of the NCPC and NU is accomplished by 
directors fiom NCPC corporations holding an extensive variety of de- 
cisionmaking positions at NU, they include Foundation committee 
members, the University President, Chancellors of UN-L and UN-0, 
Vice Chancellor, Athletic Director, Foundation Board of Directors, 
and so forth. They are in positions to influence the major decisions 
of the University. Corporate influence no longer obtrudes itselffrom 
outside into the university. It has become internalized within the uni- 
versity as academic administrators become active participants in the 
central planning core. Thus, the pecuniary logic now dominatesfrom 
within the institution of higher learning. Whether this can be consid- 
ered a general model, or just a special Nebraska case, will not be known 
until similar research is completed in other states with other state uni- 
versities. 
The findings in Nebraska also make us rethink where the center of 
the CPC may reside, especially at the regional level. Traditionally we 
have not thought of such extensive integration as found in Nebraska 
between the CPC and the university system. The Nebraska case may 
be, as stated earlier, unique. If it is not, what are the d c a t i o n s  on 
a broader basis? To what extent does the corporate center reside in the 
university? We saw fiom the data above that the NU system has more 
primary overlaps with other corporations than FirsTier does. Thus, 
NU is also a potential translock for corporate planning. In addition, 
through NU the number of secondary and tertiary translocks among 
NCPC corporations are vastly increased 
The traditional statement about power is that power is dependent on 
a combination of wealth, violence, and knowledge. We would probably 
all find fault with the statement. For example, most of us would want 
technology and organization to be included. Whatever the final set of 
determinants of power we might agree upon, knowledge would be in- 
cluded. We also know that in a modem society, knowledge has become 
more important than the other d e t e h t s .  This means that a knowl- 
edge center such as the university will become of greater interest to any 
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organization seeking power. Thus, we could surmise that the university 
will become more integrated with the prominent core organbations of 
society. The questions of how the university overlaps with any societal 
institution it serves, and how a democracy can determine the answers 
to those questions require that serious attention be given to organiza- 
tional overlap. 
Notes 
1. The data base was c o l l d  from public information sources. Those 
sources are listed below. The data base is for 1988 and 1989. Information 
from two years is included because the 1988-1989 data base best fits the 
1988-1989 academic year at the University of Nebraska, and the final con- 
cern is with the relationship of the NCPC to the university. The sources 
are: Electronic Yellow Pages. 1989. Dunn and Bradstreet; Standard and 
Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors andExecutives. 1989. New York: 
McGraw Hill: Vol 1; Annual Statements, Section D, 1988. Lincoh, State 
of Nebraska, Insurance Department; Domestic Corporation Occupation 
Tax Report. 1989. LincoIn: State of Nebraska, Office of the Secretary of 
State; McFadden American Bank Directory* Nebraska. 1989. Nomss,  
Ga.: McFadden Business Publications (Springx Million Dollar Directory: 
America's Leading Public and Private Companies. 1989. Parsippany: Dunn 
and Bradstreet Corp; and Compact Disclosure Version 3.7US. 1989. Be- 
thesda, Md.: Disclosure Incorporated (January). 
2. The computer disk is available tiom the authors. 
3. Among the smaller banks deleted from consideration for the CPC, there 
appears to be divided spheres of influence. There seem to be three distinct 
groups. In the first group, one member of the board of FirsTier Financial 
serves on the boards of Farmers State Bank and Trust-Aurora, First United 
Bank-Neligh, Fanners State Bank and Trust-Lexington, First National 
BanbWisner, and the Bank of Papillion. In a second group, one member 
of the Board of First National of Nebraska serves on the board of Farmers 
and Merchants-Bloomfield, Burt County Bank, Washington Bank, and 
Harlan County Bank In the third group are members of the Acklie family. 
They serve on the Boards of the Bank of Norfolk, Packers Bank and Trust, 
and First National Bank of Lyons. Duane Acklie is also on the NCPC 
boards of Crete Carrier, Ameritas Life Ins., and Lincoln Telecommunica- 
tions. 
4. A qualitative survey needs to be conducted in the future to validate which 
weights are most appropriate. 
5. Almost all of the NCPC members listed in Appendix B are non-Hispanic 
caucasian male Republicans. 
6. The required and recommended courses in the Agribusiness Program do 
not include courses on (1) occupational health and safety, (2) environmen- 
tal protection and regulation, (3) or anti-trust regulation. Anyone with even 
a newspaper acquaintance of the agribusiness industry knows those are 
three of the major areas of concern in the industry. 
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CPSP 
CPC 
NCPC 
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PDT 
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SDT 
TCT 
TDT 
SFM 
SFD 
BOD 
D 
u 
UD 
NU 
UN-L 
UN-0 
B&F 
Appendix A 
Glossary of Acronym Md Symbols 
Centralized Private Sector Planning 
Central Planning Core 
Nebraska Central Planning Core 
Primary Corporate Translock 
Primary Director Translock 
Secondary Corporate lianslock 
Secondary DirectoI Translock 
Tertiary Corporate lianslock 
Tertiary Director Translock 
Social Fabric Matrix 
Social Fabric Digraph 
Board of Directors 
Member of a Board of Diredors 
University Decision Maker 
University Decision Maker Who Is Also a Director for a Corporation 
University of Nebrsska (Entire System) 
University of Nebraska-L'mcoln 
University of Nebrasks-Omaha 
Budget and Fiance Committee 
Appendix B 
Persm Who Comprise the Nebraska Central P M r g  Core (NCPC) Tramlacks 
and Their Positions with NCPC Corporations and NU, 1988--89 
1. Abel George P. 
2 Aclttie,Duane 
3. Acklie. Phyllis 
4. Bekins, Fredrick M. 
5. CaIhoun. David 
6. Cate, Sydney 
7. Cochran. John L 
8. Conley, Eugene A. 
9. Cook William w. Jr. 
FirsTier Financial Director 
Woodmen Acc. &Life Director 
University of Nebraska Fmdatioa Adm Comm 
University of Nebraska F m d a b  Exec Colnm 
University of Nebraska Fmdation BOD 
Amexitas Life Ins. Director 
Crete Canier I'res.. Director 
Lincoln TelecommMications Director 
CreteCanier VP. Director 
Union Bank &Trust Director 
Guarantee Mutual Life Director 
Norwest Nebraska Fmdation Nom Comm 
University of Nebraska Fmdatioa Nom Comm 
First Commerce Bancshares Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Adm Comm 
Valmont Director 
Guarantee Mutual Life Director 
Norwest Nebraska I'res., Director 
Norwest Nebraska Director 
Guarantee Mutual Life I'res., Director 
Ameritas Life Director 
Lincoln Telecommunications Director 
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11. Devaney, Robert S. 
13. Faith, Marshall 
14. Faulkner, Edwin J. 
15. Fletcher, Philip B. 
16. Forke, Ted J. 
17. Frazier, Larry A 
18. Geist, James 
19. Goebel, John W. 
20. Creer, J. Taylor 
21. Haessler, John 
22  Harper, Charles M. 
23. Heider. Chdes E 
24. Henning. Thomas E 
25. Holds Leland L.S. 
26. Johnson, Wanen 
27. Klosterman, John 
28. Maddux. W. John 
29. Maenner, John R. 
30. Massengale, h1iutin 
C d g r a  Director 
FirsTier Financial Director 
Peter Kiewit Director 
Valmont Chrm, Director 
First Cot.~lmerce Bancshares Director 
University of Nebraska Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
Nomest Nebraska Director 
Lincoln Telecoll~nunications Director 
Woodmen Acc. & Life Director 
COnAgra Resident 
FirsTier FinanciaI l)i~ector 
Security Mutual Director 
First Commerce Banahares Director 
Famrers Mutual Pres.. Director 
FirsTh Financial Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Adm Comm 
Lincoln Telecommunications CEO, Director, Pres. 
Norwest Nebraska Director 
University of Nebraska Vice Chancellor, UN-L 
Lincoln Telmunicat ions  Director 
First Connnerce Bancshares Director 
Security Mutual Directar 
University of Nebraska Foundation Award Comm 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
Woodmen Acc &Life CEO, Director 
FirsTier Financial Dimtor 
W g r a  ~ D i r e c t o r . C E 0  
Peter Kiewit Director 
Valrnont Director 
FirsTier Financial Director 
First Commerce Bancshares Director 
First Conrmerce Bancshares Vice President 
Security Mutual Director 
First Colllmerce Bancshares Director 
Security Mutual CEO. Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Exec Comm 
FirsTier Financial Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
University of Nebraska Foundation Award Comm 
FirsTier Financial Director 
Ameritas Life Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
University of Nebraska Foundation Award Comm 
University of Nebraska Foundation Adm Cotnm 
FirsTier Financial Director 
Woodmen Acc. & Life Director 
University of Nebraska Chancellor, UN-L 
University of Nebraska Vice President 
84 F. Gregory Hayden and Kurt Stephenson 
31. Minnick, Gates 
3 2  Nackerud,Narman 
33. Olsson. John E 
34. Osborne,Tom 
35. Ostergad, Tonn M. 
36. PaynqJohnW. 
38. Perkina Dwight 
39. Roskens. Ronald 
40. Schorr.PaulD.,IIl 
41. S c h w e n d i i  Gary 
42 Scott. Walter Jr. 
43. Snibante. AJ. 
44. Seward,Hany 
45. Smith, William C. 
46 Tekolste. Dale 
47. Tistman. Date 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
FirsTier Financial Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
University of Nebraska Foundation Dev Comm 
FirsTier Financial Director 
First Commerce Bancshares Director 
Norwest Nebraska Director 
Ameritas L i e  Director 
First Commerce Bancshms Director 
Security Mutual Director 
University of Nebraska Head Football Coach, UN-L 
CreteCarria Vice President 
Union Bank & 'Ziust Dkcm 
First Commenx Bancshares Director 
University of Nebraska Board of Regents 
L i n c o l n T e l ~ c a t i o n s  Director 
First Commerce Bancshares Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation B&F Cornm 
Fanners Mutual Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
University of Nebraska Foundation Exec Corn 
University of Nebiaska President 
Guarantee Mutual Life Director 
Ameritas Life Director 
Lincdn Telecommunications Director 
First Commerce Bancshares Director 
University of Nebraska Dean. Col of Bus Adm, UN-L 
V h t  Director 
Berkshire Hathaway Director 
ConAgra Director 
FirsTim Financial Director 
Peter Kiewit Pres.. Dir, Chrm 
Valmont Director 
FirsTim Financial Director 
Guarantee Mutual Life Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Dev Cornm 
Lincdn Telecommunications Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Exec Comm 
Ameritas Life Director 
Farmers Mutual Director 
Firslier Financial Director, CEO, Chrm 
Lincoln Telemmmunications Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
University of Nebraska Foundation B&F Comrn 
Guarantee Mutnal Life Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Award C o r n  
University of Nebraska Foundation Exec Comm 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
Firslier Financial Director 
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48. Qner,NealE Ameritas Life C h m s ~ , C E O , ~  
FirsTkr Financial Director 
49. Varner, Duaward B. Lincoln T e l d c a t i m  Director 
ValmOnt Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Consultant 
50. Weber, Del NarwestBankNebraska Directar 
University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
University of Nebraska ~ l l o r ,  UN-0 
University of Nebraska Vice F'resident 
51. Welsh, William F., I1 FirsTi Financial Director 
valmont CEO, Dinctar 
5 2  Whitehead. Milton University of Nebraska Foundation Exec C ~ m m  
FirsTi Financial Director 
University of Nebraska F d t i o n  BOD 
University of Nebraska Foundation Nom Comm 
53. Woods. Thomas C. JL FirsTk Financial Director 
Lincoln Tcleumununications Chnn, Director 
Woodmen Acc & Life Director 
54. Yanney. Michael University of Nebraska Foundation BOD 
FirsTi Financial Director 
University of Nebraska Foundation Dev Comm 
* '"This list of names corresponds to the tramlocks displayed in Figures 4.5.6, and 7. 
'Ihese members m e  on additional (non-core) boards. This list. however, includes d y  
their membership on the 15 con corporations and the University of Nebraska." 
ERRATUM 
The following paragraphs were deleted from the printed ver- 
sion of F. Gregory Hayden and Kurt Stephenson, "Corporate 
Transorganization and Veblen's Thesis on Higher Education," 
Journal of Economic Issues 26, no.1 (March 1992): 53-85. The 
deleted paragraphs should follow the first paragraph under the 
heading "Relevant Corporate Transorganizational Literature" on 
page 56: 
Fombrun, in 1986, stated that we needed to recognize that  
"structure is a complex construct whose disaggregation in extant 
research has artificially compartmentalized complementary 
aspects of organization." He believed that  theories of structure 
had artificially segregated various streams of organizational re- 
search. He stated that structure should be understood to be a con- 
figuration of infrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure. 
"Thus within organizations, structure is an  edifice resting on the 
intrastructural foundation of a technological solution to the 
production problem, framed by a sociostructure of interactions, 
around which crystallizes a set of superstructural norms and 
values" [Fombrun 1986, 406; emphasis added]. Fombrun seemed 
to be unaware of the works of Bert M. Evans and John R. Munkirs 
that  had already established corporate transorganizational ap- 
proaches. I 
For years Professor Evans taught a t  the University of Nebras- 
k a  that  the economy of the United States is a corporate enterprise 
economy and not a free enterprise economy. I t  is an economy 
which is planned a t  the center, by what Fombrun referred to as  
the sociostructure corporations. According to Evans, that  
sociostructure of large banks and insurance companies overlaps 
with the production infrastructure to guide the producers a t  the 
national and the local levels. 
One of Evans' professors a t  Harvard, Edward H. Chamberlain, 
developed the theory of monopolistic competition about which he 
stated, in 1933, that  most industries had evolved to a point that  
they were dominated by a few firms. These firms, Chamberlain 
stated, without overt collusion or organizational overlap, recog- 
nized their interdependence; and thus, in their pricing, production 
and distribution policies, each corporation took into consideration 
the reaction of others to its own decisions. Chamberlain indicated 
that this system of mutual dependence recognized led to problems 
such as monopoly pricing, unemployment, and economic waste 
[Chamberlain 19621. Evans followed the lead of another of his 
professors, John K Galbraith, who had found the corporate sector 
in the U.S. to be planned [Galbraith 19671. In his own work, Evans 
observed that the system had evolved beyond one of mutual de- 
pendence recognized to one of mutual advantage recognized a.rran- 
gements among corporations. Corporations were no longer just 
recognizing other corporations. They had evolved to a point of ar- 
ranging for pervasive overlapping decision making and planning 
for their mutual advantage. Evans referred to this as  a corporate 
enterprise system, as opposed to the free enterprise system of an 
earlier era. The corporate enterprise system "does not compete in ' 
the old-fashioned economic sense. Rather the economic struggles 
center, around strategies for control. . . ." [Evans 1980, 21. "It isn't 
competition-it is the mutual adoption and standardization of 
methods of avoiding the effects of competition" [1980,61. 
Evans divided his explanation into two historical stages. 
"Stage one became a matter of business stabilization through 
mutual accommodation within the industrial family" 11980, 101. 
These industrial families "shared markets and adopted product 
and pricing patterns . . . " [1980, 71. Stage two of the corporate 
enterprise system developed as overlapping arrangements across 
industries acquired a larger share of the growing national product. 
The multi-national, dominant core, shared monopoly groups. . . 
looked a t  each other and saw that in some cases one industrial' or 
product line group or another received a bigger piece of the bigger 
pie than themselves. It  became apparent to these industrial or 
business groups that it wasn't enough to protect themselves within 
the group. Mutual advantage recognized arrangements worked 
within the group; but each saw the need for a strategy to secure a 
larger piece of the growing pie [1980,81. 
According to Evans a central core, whose regular practices had 
not solidified (although he believed that it was dominated by New 
York banks and insurance companies) gave guidance to the sys- 
tem. Central core decisions emanate from the collective overlap of 
numerous cores. "The dominant cores of the various multinational 
industrial or business groups collectively have set the pattern and 
mostly the rest of us try to survive" [1980,91. 
All citations are to references listed in Hayden and Stephenson 
[19921. 
